Criminal Trial Procedure by Sullivan, Francis C.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 43 | Number 2
Developments in the Law, 1981-1982: A Symposium
November 1982
Criminal Trial Procedure
Francis C. Sullivan
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Francis C. Sullivan, Criminal Trial Procedure, 43 La. L. Rev. (1982)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol43/iss2/7
CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCEDURE
Francis C. Sullivan*
PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY
For the defendant in a criminal trial faced with a barrage of
publicity surrounding the crime and the subsequent pretrial pro-
ceedings, the primary remedy is the motion for change of venue.' In
State v. Wilkerson,2 Justice Blanche, speaking for the court, presents
an excellent summary of the current Louisiana law on this subject.
The leading Louisiana case concerning change of venue is State v. Bell,'
which sets out certain factors to be considered by a trial judge in
determining whether a change of venue is to be granted. These rele-
vant factors bear repeating:
(1) the nature of pretrial publicity and the particular degree to
which it has circulated in the community, (2) the connection of
government officials with the release of the publicity, (3) the length
of time between the dissemination of the publicity and the trial,
(4) the severity and notoriety of the offense, (5) the area from
which the jury is to be drawn, (6) other events occurring in the
community which either affect or reflect the attitude of the com-
munity or individual jurors toward the defendant, and (7) any fac-
tors likely to affect the candor and veracity of the prospective
jurors on voir dire.4
In Wilkerson, the defendants were charged with the aggravated kid-
napping of the town marshal of Delhi and a Louisiana state trooper.
The court found that the defendant failed to meet his burden of proof5
to establish that he could not obtain a fair trial in Richland Parish,
where the prosecution was pending. The accused failed to prove that
Copyright 1982, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 621-627.
2. 403 So. 2d 652 (La. 1981). The court was comprised of Justices Calogero, Den-
nis, Blanche, and Lemmon, Judges Redmann and Kliebert of the Louisiana Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal, and Judge Cutrer of the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of
Appeal. Justice Lemmon concurred on other grounds. Redmann, Justice Ad Hoe,
dissented. See State v. Petterway, 403 So. 2d 1157, 1161 (La. 1981) (Redmann, J., dissent-
ing); see also Hargrave, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982-Louisiana Constitutional
Law, 43 LA. L. REV. 505 (1982) (text at note 11).
3. 315 So. 2d 307 (La. 1975); see also State v. Berry, 329 So. 2d 728 (La. 1976).
4. 315 So. 2d at 311.
5. See State v. Sonnier, 379 So. 2d 1336 (La. 1980); LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 622.
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there existed in the collective mind of the community such prejudice
that a fair trial was impossible. The general rule is that it is not suf-
ficient to show mere knowledge by the public of the facts surround-
ing the events,6 and the decision of the trial court on the motion for
change of venue will not be disturbed in the absence of an affirmative
showing by the defendant of an abuse of judicial discretion.7
In State v. Monroe,' the Louisiana Supreme Court took pains to
point out that where a claim of newspaper prejudice was raised, the
particular prejudicial publicity may provide grounds for a change of
venue, but it does not entitle a defendant to set aside an entire petit
jury venire.'
In State v. Rodrigue,'° the Louisiana Supreme Court found that
the trial judge had correctly denied the defendant's motion for a
change of venue where the defendant was charged with the "fear-
some, random" second degree murder and attempted aggravated rape
of a 51 year-old woman. As a part of the alleged prejudicial publicity,
the sheriff had arranged for a publisher-photographer and a reporter
to be present at the arrest of the accused, which resulted in a front
page photograph of the defendant in handcuffs and featured coverage
of his ride to the courthouse in a police car. The trial judge conducted
a "dry-run"'" voir dire hearing of thirty prospective jurors, out of which
only nine indicated they had formed an opinion as to the defendant's
guilt. The court concluded that if this had been an actual voir dire,
6. State v. Felde, 382 So. 2d 1384 (La. 1980).
7. State v.. Adams, 394 So. 2d 1204 (La. 1981).
8. 397 So. 2d 1258 (La. 1981).
9. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 419 provides in part: "A general venire, grand jury venire,
or petit jury venire shall not be set aside for any reason unless fraud has been prac-
ticed or some great wrong committed that would work irreparable injury to the
defendant."
10. 409 So. 2d 556 (La. 1982). Justices Lemmon and Marcus concurred.
11. See State v. Adams, 394 So. 2d 1204 (La. 1981); State v. Baldwin, 388 So. 2d
679, 682 n.2 (La. 1980). See also Sullivan, Developments In The Law, 1980-1981-Criminal
Trial Procedure, 42 LA. L. REV. 647, 652 (1982):
In this process potential jurors are called and examined as on vior dire to deter-
mine the nature and extent of the publicity and the attitude of the community
towards the accused. If the trial judge is unconvinced as a result of the question-
ing and denies the motion, the actual selection of trial jurors then begins. Chief
Justice Dixon in a brief concurrence in which Justice Blanche joined, stated that
he did "not agree that this court approved 'dry run voir dire' in change of venue
hearings," but despite this, the dry run seemingly is the most effective tool
available to the trial judge in his efforts to determine the community reaction
to media reports. This question is most difficult to determine and is without other
readily available means of proof. Other than the time necessary to conduct the
hearing, few real objections probably may be made, and the time is well spent
on such pretrial efforts.
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a fair and impartial jury could have been selected. 2 The court, speak-
ing through Justice Dennis, was influenced clearly by the fact that
a two-year period would have elasped between the time of the crime
and the period of publicity and the time that the judgment of the
court would become final. "In all probability, the force of the publici-
ty would have been spent before the time the case was set for trial."13
Acting out of an abundance of caution, however-"in case [it had] mis-
judged the situation" 4-the court directed that the trial court defer
ruling on the motion for change of venue until after the voir dire,
in case difficulty was "encountered in obtaining an unbiased jury.""5
This is certainly a usual, but worthwhile, approach to the review
of the denial of a motion for change of venue. It, however, does leave
entirely open for the trial judge and the attorney for the defendant
the question as to what precisely is meant by "difficulty." It must
be clear that this does not mean simply the exercise of all of the defen-
dant's peremptory challenges, nor simply the statement by a number
of prospective jurors that they will have difficulty in ignoring the
fact of the prior publicity. This author expects a Rodrigue II or its
equivalent in answer to this question." In State v. McDonald," the
court was presented with a different method of attack on alleged
pretrial prejudicial publicity. Here, in addition to a motion for change
of venue, the defendant moved to close the pretrial hearings on
motions to quash and motions for discovery. This was done in an ob-
vious effort to insulate the accused from any additional publicity. In
this connection it should be noted that the state made no opposition
to this defense request. Once again, the court took the opportunity,
as did the United States Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia,8 to point but that a defendant has no sixth or four-
teenth amendment right to a closed trial or hearing.'9 The Louisiana
12. The court used the minimum qualification for jurors established by the Supreme
Court in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). The selected juror must be able to "lay
aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented
in court." Id. at 723
13. 409 So. 2d at 560 (citing United States v. Carper, 13 F.R.D. 483 (D.D.C. 1953)).
14. 409 So. 2d at 560.
15. Id. (citing United States v. Wilkerson, 548 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
16. See also State v. Willie, 410 So. 2d 1019 (La. 1982), in which two months prior
to trial, the district attorney was "quoted as stating that he would personally conduct
the prosecution to make sure that 'these two animals' would not walk the streets
again." Id. at 1024. The court found that the brief remark had "probably lost whatever
force it had by the time of trial." Id.
17. 404 So. 2d 889 (La. 1981). The court was comprised of Justices Calogero, Den-
nis, Blanche, and Lemmon, Judges Redmann and Kliebert of the fourth circuit, and
Judge Cutrer of the third circuit.
18. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
19. "It appears there is no constitutional right to a closed hearing." Id. at 894
n.5. See also State v. Kent, 391 So. 2d 429 (La. 1980).
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Supreme Court left open, however, the possibility that a criminal pro-
ceeding could be closed under circumstances so extreme that other-
wise the rights of the accused would be prejudiced. 0 In the instant
case, the defendant was unable to demonstrate any prejudice by the
denial of his request for closed hearings, and a general purpose simply
to avoid further publicity is clearly not sufficient to justify the ex-
treme remedy of closing the proceedings.21
State v. Goodson22 brought to the attention of the Louisiana
Supreme Court problems arising out of the indictment of the alleged,
"Highland Rapist" in Bossier and Caddo Parishes. This particular opin-
ion concerns the denial of the defendant's motion for change of venue
20. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979); see also text at note 47, infra.
21. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 43.1 (Preliminary Draft 1981):
(a) Proceedings Covered. Except as otherwise provided by law, the provisions
of this rule are- applicable to:
(1) any portion of the trial that takes place outside the presence of the jury,
if the jury has not been sequestered;
(2) any voir dire examination of prospective jurors; and
(3) any pretrial hearing.
The provisions of this rule are not applicable to bench conferences, conferences
in chambers, or matters customarily handled in camera.
(b) Motion for Closure. Upon a motion for closure of a proceeding or portion
thereof made or consented to by any defendant on the record, the court shall
permit the parties and members of the public and news media present and object-
ing to be heard. If necessary, the court may conduct all or part of the hearing
on the motion in camera. The court shall order that the public, including represen-
tatives of the news media, be excluded from the proceeding or a portion thereof
upon a finding
(1) that there is a reasonable likelihood that dissemination of information from
the proceeding would interfere with the defendant's right to a fair trial by an
impartial jury; and
(2) that the prejudicial effect of such information on trial fairness cannot be
avoided by any reasonable alternative means.
The court shall make findings for the record supporting the ruling on the motion,
but in its discretion some or all of those findings may be sealed and preserved
in the records of the court to be made available to the appellate court in the
event of an appeal.
(c) Partial Closure. Whenever the court could otherwise order closure under
subdivision (b), it may limit the persons permitted to attend and condition such
attendance upon agreement to the court's order restricting the time at which
persons in attendance may disclose to others matters occurring at the proceeding
or portion therof partially closed. Findings supporting such ruling and order shall
be made for the record as provided in subdivision (b).
(d) Public Access to Record. Whenever the public has been excluded under sub-
division (b) or (c) of this rule, a complete record of the proceeding or portion thereof
from which the public has been excluded shall be kept and shall be made available
to the public following return of the verdict or at such other time as may be
consistent with defendant's right to a fair trial.
22. 412 So. 2d 1077 (La. 1982). Justice Marcus concurred. A supervisory writ was
granted to review the denial of the defendant's motion for change of venue.
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in the Bossier Parish proceeding. The trial judge found that although
the pretrial publicity had been extensive, it was not demonstrated
to be inflammatory, nor was it shown that prejudice existed against
the accused. Justice Dennis used this occasion to point out that pre-
judice against the defendant may be either presumed or actual. Pre-
judice has been presumed in the unusual and rare circumstances pre-
sent in the well known Supreme Court cases of Rideau v. Louisiana"2
and Sheppard v. Maxwell." The principle that prejudice against the
accused may be presumed from unusual circumstances also has been
recognized in Louisiana. 5 However, the court in Goodson was unable
to find in the record any sufficiently unusual reasons or circumstances
that would justify a presumption of prejudice in the Bossier community
against the accused.
In addition to presumed prejudices, the accused has a right to
demonstrate the existence of actual prejudice against him which
would prevent him from obtaining that panel of impartial jurors to
which he is constitutionally entitled.' Turning to this question in Good-
son, Justice Dennis pointed out that it was impossible to decide the
question of actual prejudice with reference to prospective jurors since
the voir dire examination had not yet taken place. As in Rodrigue,28
the trial judge was directed to defer ruling on the motion for change
of venue until completion of the voir dire.29
Then, in a most interesting and important step, the Goodson court
directed that "[s]ince there [was] a significant possibility that individual
jurors [would] be ineligible to serve because of exposure to potentially
prejudicial material,"' the voir dire examination was to be governed
by specific guidelines based upon the standard developed by the
American Bar Association.' These guidelines are as follows:
(1) the examination of each juror shall take place outside the
presence of both selected and prospective jurors; (2) a record of
the examination shall be maintained by court reporter or tape
recorder whenever possible; (3) the questioning shall be for the
purpose of determining what the prospective juror has read and
23. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
24. 384 U.S. 333 (1966). The Goodson court also cites Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532 (1965) for this proposition. But see Chandler v. Florida, 101 S. Ct. 802 (1981); United
States v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1982).
25. 412 So. 2d at 1080.
26. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
27. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
28. 409 So. 2d 556 (La. 1982).
29. 412 So. 2d at. 1081.
30. Id.
31. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Fair Trial and Free Press S 8-3.5 (1980).
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heard about the case and how this exposure has affected that per-
son's attitude, not to convince the prospective juror that an in-
ability to cast aside any preconception would be a dereliction of
duty; (4) both the degree of exposure and the state of mind of
the prospective juror are relevant to the determination of accept-
ability; (5) a prospective juror testifying as to an inability to over-
come preconceptions shall be subject to challenge for cause no
matter how slight the exposure; (6) if the prospective juror
remembers information that will be developed at trial or that may
be inadmissible, but that does not create a substantial risk of im-
pairing judgment, that person's acceptability shall depend upon
the credibility of the testimony as to impartiality; (7) if an opin-
ion as to guilt is admitted, the prospective juror shall be suject
to challenge for cause unless the examination shows "unequivocal-
ly" the capacity to be impartial; (8) a prospective juror who has
been exposed to and remembers highly significant information
(such as the existence or contents of a confession or other inad-
missible incriminating matters) or substantial amounts of inflam-
matory material, shall be subject to challenge for cause without
regard to the prospective juror's testimony as to state of mind.32
Justice Blanche, concurring in part and dissenting in part, commented
that although the court's "advice" seemed fair, it "may or may not
have been the product of the adversary concept of judicial proceed-
ings."33 He additionally noted that the guidelines may induce some
trial judges to elect to "play it safe and excuse anyone" who ever
heard about the accused.34
It seems clear that the majority intends the standards to be used
by trial judges in all cases where "serious questions of possible pre-
judice are raised."35 As Justice Blanche pointed out, the guidelines
are fair, and to conduct a voir dire reasonable in scope and to grant
challenges for cause where there is reason for doubt seems to be a
much more satisfactory solution to the problems presented by pretrial
prejudicial publicity than is the change of venue, unless a venue change
is absolutely required in the interests of justice.
32. 412 So. 2d at 1081. Note the provisions of LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 797(2):
The state or defendant may challenge a juror for cause on the ground that:
(2) The juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his partiality. An opinion or
impression as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant shall not of itself be suffi-
cient ground of challenge to a juror, if he declares, and the court is satisfied, that
he can render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence.
33. 412 So. 2d at 1081.
34. Id. Justice Blanche dissented from the remand with instructions. Justice Wat-
son believed the change of venue should have been granted.
35. Id.
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The effects of prejudicial publicity occurring during the course
of trial were raised in State v. Manuel.' In this possession of nar-
cotics prosecution, the trial judge refused a defense motion to ques-
tion the jurors as to whether they had seen a particular newscast
on the evening of the second day of trial. The newscast allegedly referred
to the defendants on trial both graphically and inaccurately. Point-
ing out that the trial judge had previously admonished the jurors not
to watch any newscast nor to read anything in the newspaper about
the trial, the court held, that there was no abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial judge in denying the motion. Justice Marcus did point
.out that the better, approach might have been to inquire whether any
jurors had seen the newscast.37 This author certainly agrees with this
suggested method of dealing with a frequently met problem.
SPEEDY TRIAL
The long and torturous saga of Captain Jeffrey R. MacDonald in
his attempt to avoid conviction of the murder of his pregnant wife
and two children appears finally to have come to an end. The United
States Supreme Court, in United States v. MacDonald,8 in effect
reinstated Dr. MacDonald's conviction by reversing the judgment of
the Fourth Circuit, which had held that the indictment violated Mac-
Donald's sixth amendment right to a'speedy trial. The history of the
MacDonald case began with the formal charge of MacDonald by the
Army on May 1, 1970. These military charges were dismissed on
October 23, 1970, and on December 5, 1970, MacDonald was discharged
from the Army on grounds of hardship. The matter did not end
there, however, and the investigation of MacDonald continued, final-
ly resulting in the return of a federal grand jury indictment on
January 24, 1975. Prior to his trial on the three murder counts, Mac-
Donald moved to dismiss the indictment and the case went to the
Supreme Court for the first time; the Court then held that a criminal
defendant could not appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss on speedy
trial-sixth amendment ground's until post-trial. 9
36. 408 So. 2d 1235 (La. 1982). The court consisted of Justices Calogero, Marcus,
Dennis, and Watson, Judges Price and Jones of the second circuit, and Judge Boutall
of the fourth circuit.
37. Id. at 1238. The court also cited ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Fair
Trial & Free Press S 8-3.6 (1978): "The American Bar Association's Standards for
Criminal Justice provides that the court should question each juror, out of the presence
of the others, about their exposure to prejudicial information." 408 So. 2d at 1238 n.2.
38. 102 S. Ct. 1497 (1982), on remand, 31 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2482 (4th Cir. Aug.
16, 1982).
39. United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978).
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When MacDonald's trial was completed, the speedy trial issue was
squarely presented for consideration by the Court. Chief Justice
Burger, speaking for the majority of the Court, stated that until the
grand jury returned the indictments, MacDonald was not subject to
any criminal prosecution after the military charges had been dismissed.
Therefore, the period between the dismissal of the military charges
and the indictment should not have been considered in determining
whether or not there was a speedy trial violation. Reiterating that
the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial attaches only when a
formal criminal charge is instituted and a criminal prosecution begins,
the Court pointed out that during this intervening investigatory
period, MacDonald was legally and constitutionally in the same posture
as though no charges had been filed against him. The majority opin-
ion also pointed out that the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial
is not intended primarily to prevent prejudice to the defendant which
is caused by the passage of time. This interest is protected primarily
by both the due process clause in the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments and by appropriate statutes of limitations.
Justice Marshall, in his dissent,' disagreed with the majority,"
stating that the speedy trial right was suspended during the interven-
ing period between dismissal by the Army and federal civilian indict-
ment. Although Justice Marshall found the question close, he felt that
MacDonald's speedy trial rights were in fact violated. 2 It now seems
clear that the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial is to be used
to measure delays running between arrest and trial, ' with delays prior
to arrest or similar official. accusation being measured by the due pro-
cess clause of the fifth or fourteenth amendment, whichever is
applicable."
In this connection, it is interesting to note that in State v. Dewey,'5
the Louisiana Supreme Court, in one of the most recent speedy trial
cases, pointed out that the sixth amendment rightto a speedy trial
attaches "when an individual becomes an accused whether by formal
indictment or bill of information or by arrest and actual restraint."'
40. 102 S. Ct. at 1504. Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined in the dissent.
41. Justice Stevens concurred with this point in his concurring opinion. Id. at 1503.
42. Id. at 1509.
43. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971); State v. Perkins, 374 So. 2d 1234
(La. 1979).
44. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U.S. 213 (1967); see Sullivan, Developments In The Law, 1979-1980-Criminal Trial Pro-
cedure, 41 LA. L. REV. 582, 583 (1981).
45. 408 So. 2d 1255 (La. 1982).
46. Id. at 1257. The right to a speedy trial is also guaranteed by LA. CONST. art.
I, 16.
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PUBLIC TRIAL
In 1980, the Louisiana Legislature adopted a new provision 7 allow-
ing the victim of certain sex crimes," when under 15 years of age,
to testify either in closed session or in the judge's chambers. The
section authorizes only the following persons to be present:
the judge or jury, the defendant, counsel for the defendant, the
family of the defendant, the parents or parent of the victim, the
attorney for the, state, a reasonable but limited number of
members of the public which the court may allow in its discretion
under these circumstances, and any other party which the court
determines has a valid interest in the proceedings. 9
Since the adoption of this provision, various questions have been raised
concerning its constitutionality, including specifically the question of
whether this section authorizes a trial judge to exclude the news media
from the proceedings.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,' struck down a unique Massachusetts
statute5' which was construed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court to require exclusion of the press and general public from the
court room during the testimony of a sex offense victim under the
age of 18. Justice Brennan, in the majority- opinion, relied on the
leading case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia" and rejected
the argument that this mandatory closure was necessary to encourage
minor victims to come forward and provide accurate testimony in sex
cases. The Court also found that the state interest-the physical and
psychological well being of a minor-could be safeguarded by the trial
judge's determination of the necessity for closure on a case-by-case
basis. Such a determination is to be made by weighing the minor vic-
tim's "age, psychological maturity and understanding, the nature of
the crime, the desires of the victim, and the interest of parents and
relatives."' In a dissenting opinion, the Chief Justice raised the
paradox of allowing states to close trials of juveniles to protect defen-
dants but not allowing closure to protect victims.'
47. 1980 La. Acts, No. 466, S 1, adding LA. R.S. 15:469.1. See note 21, supra.
48. These crimes are "simple rape, attempted simple rape, aggravated rape, at-
tempted aggravated rape, forcible rape, attempted forcible rape, or carnal knowledge
of a juvenile." LA. R.S. 15:469.1.
49. Id.
50. 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982).
51. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, S 16A (West 1980).
52. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
53. 102 S. Ct. at 2621 (footnote omitted).
54. Id. at 2623. Justice Rehnquist joined the Chief Justice's dissent. Justice Stevens
dissented on procedural grounds. Justice O'Connor concurred in the majority judgment.
19821
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It would appear that the Louisiana statute,55 which grants discre-
tion to the trial judge, as distinquished from the Massachusetts statute,
which had a mandatory provision, is not absolutely invalid; there may
be situations in which the particular facts presented to the trial judge
justify the entry of a closure order. It should be pointed out, however,
that such a situation would require the closure to be the only means
available to the trial judge after he has fully examined all of the sur-
rounding circumstances and determined that this action is necessary
to protect the physical and psychological well being of the child
victim.,
RIGHT To COUNSEL
Perhaps the ultimate in Faretta v. California57 cases came before
the Louisiana Supreme Court this term. In State v. Shank,' the trial court
ruled that the accused could defend himself in a first degree murder case
where he wished to be found guilty and sentenced to death. Not surpris-
ingly, the supreme court, in a per curiam opinion, reversed the ruling
of the trial court and held that the record did not affirmatively show
that the defendant was sufficiently advised and made aware of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. The court added that
"a defendant's election to represent himself for the purpose of acquiesc-
ing in his conviction of a capital offense and in his death sentence
cannot be sanctioned as an intelligent choice."59 Few would disagree
with this ruling."5
In State v. Prestridge,l the accused in a rape case raised the basic
argument that furnishing counsel to an indigent defendant is not suf-
ficient when the appointed attorney cannot secure the necessary in-
formation upon which to base an effective defense. The specific com-
plaint was that the refusal of the trial court to appoint a medical
expert at state expense forced the accused to rely upon a family physi-
cian for medical testimony. Additionally, this witness was subject to
impeachment because of his relationship with the family of the accused.
55. LA. R.S. 15:469.1 (Supp. 1980).
56. While pointing out that other states, including Louisiana, have provisions allow-
ing the trial judge to close sex prosecutions during the testimony of minor victims,
the Court was careful to add,"of course, we intimate no view regarding the constitu-
tionality of these state statutes." 102 S. Ct. at 2621 n.22.
57. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) held that a criminal defendant has
a sixth amendment right of self-representation.
58. 410 So. 2d 232 (La. 1982) (per curiam).
59. Id. at 233.
60. See United States v. Bailey, 675 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir 1982); Brown v. Wain-
wright, 665 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
61. 399 So. 2d 564 (La. 1981).
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The supreme court reiterated the rule that the state should supply funds
to the defense upon a showing that the indigent accused is unable to ob-
tain existing evidence which is crucial to his defense.2 However, where
the question upon appeal is the review of the denial of such funds, the
court pointed out that the issue is whether the denial resulted in substan-
tial prejudice to the defendant at trial. 3 Finding here that the accused
had presented a qualified medical witness, one accepted as an expert by
the trial court, the supreme court held that there was no demonstrated
prejudice, since there was no showing that an independent expert could
have obtained or presented any different or more favorable evidence for
the accused.
The equivalency of all physicians for purposes of expert testimony
in serious criminal trials is questionable. Whether there is any
reasonable means of showing prejudice in a situation like this is also
questionable. The ability to prepare an adequate defense should not
be disposed of in this manner. It is hoped that future cases will reex-
amine this issue from a Louisiana constitutional perspective. 4
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court, in Holloway v.
Arkansas,' held that when a defendant raises a pretrial objection
because of a possible conflict of interest from joint representation,
the trial court must appoint separate counsel or, at a minimum, in-
vestigate the situation to determine the risks involved if there is a
possible conflict. The failure to take either action amounts to a depriva-
tion of the sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel,
requiring automatic reversal of any conviction obtained during the
forced joint representation, even if there is no showing of specific
prejudice. In 1980, the Supreme Court considered Cuyler v. Sullivan,"
a case in which no objection to multiple representation was made until
after trial. Under these circumstances the court ruled that in order
to obtain relief, the defendant must show the conflict of interest pro-
duced actual prejudice, that is, an adverse effect on counsel's ability
to perform adequately.
In State v. Marshall,7 the Louisiana Supreme Court was faced with
a situation where the accused, represented by a court appointed at-
torney, objected to a possible conflict of interest well in advance of
trial -a situation resembling that in Holloway. As in Sullivan, however,
Marshall was tried separately and had not demonstrated any actual
62. See State v. Madison, 345 So. 2d 485 (La. 1977).
63. See State v. Harris, 383 So. 2d 1 (La. 1980).
64. See LA. CONST. art. I, S 16.
65. 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
66. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
67. 414 So. 2d 684 (La. 1982).
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prejudice because of the joint representation. The court, speaking
through Justice Blanche, decided to emphasize the time of assertion
of the claim of conflict of interest and therefore found Holloway to
be controlling, so as to require a reversal. As the court stated, "[Tihe
Supreme Court, as this court reads Holloway, has practically denied
a trial judge any discretion when counsel, before trial, asserts a claim
of conflict of interest except to appoint other counsel.""5 As Justice
Lemmon, in dissent, 9 pointed out, it is really more logical in a situa-
tion such as this-where jointly represented defendants are tried
separately-to apply the Sullivan rule, which requires a demonstra-
tion of some adverse effect on counsel's ability to perform adequately
in order to obtain relief." This was a close call, it seems to this author,
but the rule adopted by the court does have the great merit of ease
of administration by the trial courts."
JURY TRIAL
In State v. Williams,2 the state filed against the accused three
bills of information arising out of one speeding incident. The defen-
dant, represented by counsel, pleaded guilty to one charge prior to
trial, and the other two charges were consolidated and tried together
without objection. Defendant, on appeal, first raised the issue that he
was entitled to trial by jury. There is no doubt that when two or
more charges are joined for trial, it is the aggregate punishment which
may be imposed which determines whether the accused possesses a
right to trial by jury. If the total possible punishment exceeds six
months imprisonment, the accused is entitled to trial by jury. 4 Find-
ing that the total possible punishment for the two offenses exceeded
six months imprisonment, the court found that the defendant was en-
titled to trial by jury. Further, the court found that there was nothing
68. Id. at 688 (emphasis in original).
69. Id. at 689. Justices Marcus and Watson also dissented in separate opinions.
70. See State v. Franklin, 400 So. 2d 616 (La. 1981) and State v. Ross, 410 So.
2d 1388 (La. 1982), two other conflict-of-interest cases worthy of note.
71. The role and responsibility of defense counsel at sentencing receives little
attention. For an extremely thoughtful and detailed analysis of the problemis involved,
see the dissenting opinion of Senior Circuit Judge Bazelon in United States v. Green,
680 F.2d 183, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1982). For an interesting case decided in the 1981 term
concerning adequate time to prepare a defense, see State v. Simpson, 403 So. 2d
1214 (La. 1981).
72. 404 So. 2d 954 (La. 1981).
73. State v. McCarroll, 337 So. 2d 475 (La. 1976).
74. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); State v. Nettleton, 367 So. 2d 755
(La. 1979); LA. CONST. art. I, S 17.
75. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 779(A) provides: "A defendant charged with a misde-
meanor in which the punishment may be a fine in excess of five hundred dollars or
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in the record to indicate that the accused had knowingly and in-
telligently waived his right to trial by jury."6 Accordingly, the convic-
tion was reversed.
Justice Lemmon, in dissent, questioned whether the issue of the
right to a jury trial had been preserved for appeal, since there had
been no defense objection to the consolidation of the two bills of
information.7 In his view, the defendant should have been forced to
challenge the conviction by a postconviction attack." This would seem
totally unnecessary and wasteful, however, since the court had
available all of the necessary information to make its decision and
there seemed absolutely no need for a separate evidentiary hearing
to be conducted at the trial court level. Simply to affirm this case
on appeal and to force the accused to resort to a collateral attack
would accomplish nothing.79
What happens when the state separately charges an accused with
two misdemeanors"0 arising out of the same factual incident, neither
of which standing alone entitles the accused to a trial by jury,"l but
where the total penalty if convicted of both would entitle the accused
to a jury trial?' In a sense, this is the reverse of Williams,"a where
the state consolidated the two separate misdemeanors for trial. The
Louisiana Supreme Court, in State v. Comeaux,8" specifically found that
there was no consolidation. 5 Although at first blush. it appears that
a defendant's right to jury trial is completely at the mercy of the
prosecutor's charging decision, this is not really true. A defendant
imprisonment for more than six months shall be tried by a jury of six jurors, all of
whom must concur to render a verdict."
76. See State v. Johnson, 389 So. 2d 1302 (La. 1980); State v. McCarroll, 337 So.
2d 475 (La. 1976).
77. 404 So. 2d at 956. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 841: "An irregularity or error can-
not be availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence."
78. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 924-930.7.
79. See text at note 72, supra.
80. Aggravated assault and simple battery. CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:35, 37 (Supp.
1978).
81. Each carries a maximum sentence of six months imprisonment. Id.
82. LA. CONST. art. I, S 17; LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 779.
83. 404 So. 2d at 954.
84. 408 So. 2d 1099 (La. 1981). The court consisted of Chief Justice Dixon, Justices
Marcus, Blanche, and Lemmon, and Judges Covington, Cole, and Watkins of the first
circuit.
85. The court pointed out that if the defendant had moved to consolidate the
charges the trial court would have been under a duty to order consolidation unless
the state could have shown a "legitimate prosecutorial end in opposing consolidation."
Depriving the accused of a jury trial is not, of course, a legitimate prosecutorial end.
Id. at 1105. See State v. Jones, 396 So. 2d 1272 (La. 1981). But see LA. CODE CRIM.
P. art. 706.
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possesses the exclusive right to move for consolidation of the offenses
when charged separately,' and despite the actual language of article
706,7 the court has held that the denial of such a motion solely for
the purpose of avoiding a jury trial is an abuse of discretion.' Although
the defendant objected to the procedure used in this case as denying
him his right to trial by jury, the puzzle is why he failed to move
for consolidation. Having failed to do so, the accused failed to exer-
cise properly this constitutional right. 9
In State v. Jenkins" we are reminded by the Louisiana Supreme
Court that a verdict returned by a jury composed of fewer than the
correct number of jurors, in this case 6 rather than 12,"' is a nullity.
This has been the traditional holding of the court,' and it is considered
a fundamental error which mandates reversal of a conviction. 3 Justice
Lemmon, in a dissenting opinion, raises a serious question about
reversing a conviction "following a fairly conducted jury trial and
unanimous jury verdict on an issue which was not raised by defen-
dant either prior to trial or on appeal, and which does not affect the
essential fairness of the proceedings or the accuracy of the factual
determination." 4 This author agrees completely with this view. There
would seem to be no significant or substantial reason to reverse this
conviction and to remand the case for a possible retrial. Decisions
of this nature contribute little to establishing principles of finality
in the administration of criminal justice.
86. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 706, comment () provides in part:
The federal rules [FED. R. CRIM. P. 13] allow consolidation by the court on its own
motion or on motion of the state and over objection of a defendant. This article
does not permit such action; however, the state can accomplish the same result
by dismissing all charges and recharging in a consolidated form.
87. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 706 provides in part: "Upon motion of a defendant...
the court may order two or more indictments consolidated for trial if the offenses
• . . could have been joined in a single indictment." (emphasis added).
88. State v. Jones, 396 So. 2d 1272 (La. 1981).
89. Chief Justice Dixon and Justice Lemmon dissented. 408 So. 2d at 1107. In
State v. Grimble, 397 So. 2d 1254 (La. 1980), the court, with Justice Lemmon dissent-
ing, held that the trial judge may not cut off a defendant's right to a jury trial by
agreeing in advance of trial to limit the sentence in the event of conviction.
90. 406 So. 2d 1352 (La. 1981).
91. Jenkins was accused of simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling in violation
of LA. R.S. 14:62.2 (Supp. 1978), which is punishable by a minimum sentence of one year's
imprisonment at hard labor. Under the provisions of both LA. CONST. art. I, §17 and
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 782(A), the accused was entitled to a jury of twelve, ten of whom
were required to concur to render a verdict.
92. See State v. Bennett, 264 La. 129, 270 So. 2d 840 (1972); State v. Crawford,
195 La. 428, 196 So. 921 (1940); see also Starte v. Nedds, 364 So. 2d 588 (La. 1978).
93. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
94. 406 So. 2d at 1353.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW, 1981-1982
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court held, in Ballew v.
Georgia," that a criminal trial conducted before a jury composed of
only five persons deprives defendant of his right to trial by jury under
the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion. In State ex rel. Becnel v. Blackburn," the relators were adjudged
fourth-time felony offenders and, in the course of postconviction ap-
plications, attacked two of their prior convictions on the basis that
they had been convicted by five member juries. The five member jury
has been abolished in Louisiana both by revision of the Louisiana
Constitution97 and by the amendment of article 782 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. Shortly after the Ballew decision, the Louisiana
Supreme Court in State v. Robinson," held that Ballew should not be
applied retroactively to convictions obtained by juries impaneled prior
to that decision. In 1979, th/e United States Supreme Court in Burch
v. Louisiana," for basically 'the same reasons as in Ballew,0° held that
a defendant being tried by a six person jury is constitutionally entitled
to a unanimous verdict. The following year Burch was made retroac-
tive in Brown v. Louisiana."' With this background, the majority of
the Becnel court felt compelled to reverse the prior decision in Robin-
son and make the ruling in Ballew retroactive."2 Justices Marcus and
Lemmon, in dissent, pointed out that there were multiple opinions
in Brown v. Louisiana, resulting in a situation in which five members
of the United States Supreme Court as then constituted, were opposed
to complete retroactive application of Burch and therefore the Brown deci-
sion did not require the position taken by the majority in this case."3
The situation wherein a defendant charged with a misdemeanor
offense demands a trial by jury (to which he is entitled) after plea
negotiations fail is not an uncommon one. In such a situation, may
the prosecution then recharge the accused and raise the seriousness
95. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
96. 410 So. 2d 1015 (La. 1982) (three justices dissented).
97. LA. CONST. art. I, S 17.
98. 361 So. 2d 864 (La. 1978).
99. 441 U.S. 130 (1979).
100. This was done to preserve the substance of the jury trial right and to assure
the reliability of verdicts.
101. 447 U.S. 323 (1980).
102. The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had reached the same result
in Thomas v. Blackburn, 623 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 953 (1981).
103. Justice Lemmon points out in his dissent that few persons convicted by five-
person juries are still serving time in prison and that the present decision "probably
has significance only to habitual offenders." 410 So. 2d at 1018.
Justice Marcus, in dissent, stated that he believed the decision would have "a signifi-
cant disruptive effect on the administration of justice in this state without serving
the purpose of the new constitutional rule." Id.
Justice Blanche also dissented.
1982]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
of the offense to the felony level? This was the question faced
by the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v.
Goodwin.'° Here the Court was faced with the choice between the
doctrine of presumed prosecutorial vindictiveness, which it had created
in the cases of North Carolina v. Pearce'05 and Blackledge v. Perry,'°
and the rule in Bordenkircher v. Hayes,'"' under which a prosecutor
is entitled to enforce a threat made during plea negotiations to bring
additional charges against an accused who refuses to plead guilty. In
Goodwin, the court refused to create a presumption of vindictiveness
applicable to all cases, relying to a great extent on the fact that this
was a pretrial decision to modify the charges. Justice Stevens, speak-
ing for the Court, recognized that this situation did present an oppor-
tunity for vindictiveness, but he pointed out that a mere opportunity
is insufficient to justify the imposition of such a drastic rule. Absent
a presumption of vindictiveness, an accused may prove that the pro-
secutor's action in raising the charge was motivated by a desire to
punish the exercise of a valid legal right, but the record in this case
failed to establish any such due process violation. Justices Brennan
and Marshall, in dissent,' 8 could find no difference between this case
and the Blackledge case and felt that this was a clear case of pro-
secutorial vindictiveness resulting in a penalty to the accused.
Despite the language used in cases like this, the question seems
to revolve around whether the prosecution should have the burden
to justify the change in the charge or whether the defendant should
have to establish that the action of the prosecution caused specific
prejudice to him. This is indeed a close question, but the more simple
solution might be to require that the prosecution, having changed the
existing status quo, show the motivation therefore was not solely to
prejudice the accused, but rather was based upon some other
justifiable ground. This does not seem to be an unreasonable burden
to place upon the prosecution in the relatively small number of cases
where a change in the charging decision will occur after the initial
charge has been made.
In State v. Watson,"9 a proposed new solution to the perennial Bruton
v. United States,"' problem was presented to the Louisiana Supreme
104. 102 S. Ct. 2485 (1982). Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment.
105. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
106. 417 U.S. 21 (1974). Both cases involved the imposition of a penalty upon a
defendant exercising a right to attack a conviction.
107. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
108. 102 S. Ct. at 2496.
109. 397 So. 2d 1337 (La. 1981). The court consisted of Justices Calogero, Marcus,
Dennis, and Blanche and Judges Covington, Chiasson, and Lear of the-first circuit.
110. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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Court. The classic problem presented in Bruton is a joint trial in which
the confession of one defendant is admitted in evidence but the confes-
sing defendant refuses to testify and is thus unavailable for cross-
examination by the codefendant. This violates the codefendant's sixth
amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. Various
alternatives' have been suggested to solve this acute trial problem,
with separate trials being the generally accepted answer.1 2 In Wat-
son, at the request of the state and over the objection of the accused,
one trial with two juries, one for each defendant, was utilized for two
defendants charged with armed robbery. In a thorough and very
careful opinion by ad hoc Justice Lear, the court examined the history
of the dual simultaneous jury. The Louisiana Supreme Court had
previously refused to approve dual juries in a different context in
State v. Thomas"3 because of the numerous practical complications that
might arise. The court here pointed out that there is no statutory
provision authorizing such dual jury procedure and that there appears
to be no specific statutory authority in the United States. Under the
specific facts of Watson, the court found that the accused failed to
demonstrate any prejudice from the use of the dual juries and it
therefore affirmed the conviction. However, the court made the follow-
ing observations:
[I]t is presently unnecessary for the court either to approve or
to reject such a dual jury procedure as a viable alternative to
severance pursuant to Bruton .... However, it is clear that such
a procedure is not specifically authorized under the Louisiana Code
of Criminal Procedure. As vividly demonstrated in the instant case,
this procedure also presents numerous physical and legal complica-
111. Suggested alternatives include excision of prejudicial references to the codefen-
dant, see ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Joinder & Severance S 13-3.2 (1980)
which provides in part:
(a) When a defendant moves for severance because an out-of-court statement
of a codefendant makes reference to, but is not admissible against, the moving
defendant, the court should determine whether the prosecution intends to offer
the statement in evidence as part of its case in chief. If so, the court should re-
quire the prosecuting attorney to elect one of the following courses:
(ii) a joint trial at which the statement is admitted into evidence only after
all references to the moving defendant have been deleted, provided that,
as deleted, the statement will not prejudice the moving defendant.
And bifurcated joint trial withholding the confession until a verdict is returned as
to the codefendant, see United States v. Crane, 499 F.2d 1385 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1002 (1974).
112. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 704: "Jointly indicted defendants shall be tried joint-
l unless: . . . (2) The court, on motion of the defendant, and after contradictory hear-
ing with the district attorney, is satisfied that justice requires a severance."
113. 319 So. 2d 789 (La. 1975). Here, different composition of juries were elected
by the codefendants under provisions of the old and new Louisiana constitutions.
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tions, the possible drawbacks of which would appear to argue
against approval of this dual jury procedure in future cases.114
It is hoped that prompt action will be taken to add this procedure,
with appropriate safeguards, to the Code of Criminal Procedure, since
it seems clear that this procedure provides a reasonable and workable
compromise between the competing policies in this area and it should
go a long way toward expediting the disposition of cases which should
be tried together. Because an accused always may show that this
method of trial in some specific way operated to his prejudice, there
seems to be little reason not to make it available for use by the courts
of Louisiana."5
Three cases118 recently have presented the question as to whether
a defendant is entitled to an individual voir dire, that is, to inter-
rogate each prospective juror out of the presence of the other pro-
spective jurors. Consistently, in each of these cases, the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that there is no provision of law either prohibiting
or requiring such a practice, but rather the trial judge has discretion
to permit individual voir dire if a defendant can demonstrate that
special circumstances are present. The court has pointed out that the
legislature has not seen fit to establish such a rule and therefore the
trial court should use its inherent power to require individual voir
dire only in those situations necessary to insure a fair trial for the
particular defendant.
The mere fact that the case is a capital one does not create a
per se exceptional circumstance," 7 nor is the fact that a case is a
capital one involving the killing of a small child sufficient to override
the judge's discretion.18 The court did indicate that in light of the
extensive pretrial publicity in one particular case,1 9 "individual voir
dire may have been preferable," but the court still indicated that the
accused had failed to establish the "special circumstances" necessary
to upset the exercise of discretion by the trial court.1" Just what might
114. 397 So. 2d at 1342 (citation omitted).
115. See Gaynes, Two Juries/One Trial-Panacea of Judicial Economy or Personifica-
tion of Murphy's Laws, 5 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 285 (1981); Note, Criminal Law-Multiple
Jury Joint Trials-On the Joint Trial of Two Defendants, the Empanelling of Two Juries
Simultaneously is Permissible, 2 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407 (1974); see also United States
v. Rimar, 558 F.2d 1271 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 922 (1978); United States
v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1127 (1973); Feeney
v. State, 350 So. 2d 569 (Fla. App. 1978).
116. State v. Vaccaro, 411 So. 2d 415 (La. 1982); State v. Penns, 407 So. 2d 678
(La. 1981); State v. Lindsey, 404 So. 2d 466 (La. 1981).
117. Lindsey, 404 So. 2d 466.
118. Penns, 407 So. 2d 678.
119. Vaccaro, 411 So. 2d 415.
120. Id. at 426; see Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 602 (1976) (Bren-
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constitute these "special circumstances" is difficult to determine, and
the question must be asked as to why it should be so difficult to ob-
tain individual voir dire. This simply may be another instance where
convenience is given more importance than the implementation of
right. If anything has been learned in the past fe'w years, it is the
importance of peer pressure, and there is certainly little reason to
believe that prospective jurors are any less susceptible to peer
pressure than are other members of the community. Perhaps an
amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure is in order to make
this particular procedure specifically available upon motion of either
the defense or the prosecution.'2 '
In at least two cases this term, the Louisiana Supreme Court
reversed convictions on the basis of an abuse of discretion by the
trial judge in refusing to grant challenges for cause presented by the
defendant. Of most interest in these cases, perhaps, is the court's ex-
pressed attitude towards the very questionable doctrine of rehabilita-
tion of prospective jurors. In State v. Sylvester'22 and State v. Sugar,'23
the court commented that the failure of the trial court to attempt
to rehabilitate a prospective juror was of such importance as to
necessitate reversal of the conviction for failure to grant the challenge
for cause. In Sugar, the court stated that "[tihe juror might possibly
have been rehabilitated upon further questioning by the prosecutor
nan, J., concurring joined by Stewart, J., and Marshall, J.); see also note 32, supra
and accompanying text; ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Jury Use & Management
S 7 (Tent. Draft 1982):
A voir dire process should be used to elicit from persons on the jury panel infor-
mation necessary to determine their suitability to serve as jurors on a particular
case.
(a) To reduce the time required for voir dire, basic background information regard-
ing persons on the jury panel should be made available in writing to counsel
for each party on the day on which jury selection is to begin.
(b) The trial judge should conduct the initial voir dire examination. Counsel should
be permitted to question panel members under the supervision of the judge.
(c) Voir dire examination should be limited to subjects germane to the exercise
of challenges for cause and peremptory challenges. The judge should ensure that
the privacy of prospective jurors is not invaded unnecessarily during the voir
dire examination and that the questioning by counsel does not exceed the limited
purpose of the voir dire process.
(d) In criminal cases, the voir dire examination should always be held on the record.
In civil cases, the voir dire examination should be held on the record unless waived
by the parties.
121. See State v. St. Amant, 413 So. 2d 1312, 1319 (La. 1981) (on rehearing), where
the court held it was reversible error to require the examination of thirty-six jurors
at the same time. Justices Lemmon and Watson dissented. See also State v. Williams,
383 So. 2d 996 (La. 1979).
122. 400 So. 2d 640 (La. 1981).
123. 408 So. 2d 1329 (La. 1982).
1982]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
or the trial judge. Unfortunately for the state, she was not."' 4 In State
v. Ellwest Stereo Theatres, Inc.,' 5 the court utilized the rehabilitation
doctrine to find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to
allow challenges for cause. Without belaboring the point, this author
would once again uggest that the doctrine of rehabilitation may well
serve only to conceal what the entire voir dire process is designed
to expose-some bias or prejudice that will operate to prevent the
accused from receiving a fair trial. 2 ' The skill of the examiner, be
it judge or attorney, in causing the prospective juror to retract his
initial forthright and honest declarations of prejudice may do no more
than serve as a cosmetic.'
Does the trial court have the right to excuse a juror sua sponte?
In State v. Davis,'28 the Louisiana Supreme Court apparently answered
this question in the affirmative. Although the matter is not entirely
free from doubt, the court first indicated that the juror "appeared
antagonistic to the defense."'29 Questioning whether a challenge for
cause was justified by the fact that the prospective juror claimed an
inability to render a just decision, the court simply stated that juror
excusal lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. The con-
trolling provision, although the court does not make it absolutely clear,
is article 787, which authorizes the trial judge to disqualify jurors
"when for any reason doubt exists as to the competency of the pro-
spective juror to serve in the case."'3 a The official revision comment
to article 787 makes it quite clear that this right of disqualification
is the same as, but different in name from, the challenge for cause
which is available only to counsel.' It would seem that the court's
comment, "since the state did not exhaust its peremptory challenges,
124. 408 So. 2d at 1331 (footnote omitted).
125. 412 So. 2d 594 (La. 1982); see also State V. Albert, 414 So. 2d 680 (La. 1982).
126. See Sullivan, Developments In The Law: 1980-1981-Criminal Trial Procedure,
42 LA. L. REV. 647, 656-57 (1982); Sullivan, Developments In The Law, 1979-1980-Criminal
Trial Procedure, 41 LA. L. REV. 582, 588-89 (1981).
127. See People v. Branch, 46 N.Y.2d 645, 651-52, 389 N.E.2d 467, 469, 415 N.Y.S.2d
985, 988 (1979), where the court stated that "the trial court should lean toward dis-
qualifying a prospective juror of dubious impartiality, rather than testing the bounds
of discretion by permitting such a juror to serve. It is precisely for this reason that
so many veniremen are made available for jury service." See also United States V.
Chagra, 669 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1982).
128. 411 So. 2d 2 (La. 1982). The court consisted of Chief Justice Dixon, Justices
Calogero, Marcus, and Dennis, and Judges Shortess, Carter, and Savoie of the first
circuit. Justices Calogero and Dennis dissented.
129. Id. at 5.
130. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 787: "The court may disqualify a prospective petit juror
from service in a particular case when for any reason doubt exists as to the com-
petency of the prospective juror to serve in the case."
131. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art 787, official revision comment, states in part: "It is
necessary to give the judge the right to disqualify, a challenge being available only
to counsel."
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an erroneous sua sponte excusal of a prospective juror might not afford
the defendant a ground for complaint,"'" is simply one of those
regretably dubious statements.
State v. Marshall" presented a situation in which a juror who
had been accepted and sworn was challenged for cause by the state
on the ground that the juror was seen talking to the defendant in
the hallway during a recess. The trial judge, acting prior to the reading
of the information, sustained the challenge for cause and replaced the
juror with an alternate juror. Under the provisions of article 795,13
a juror cannot be challenged after having been accepted unless the
ground for that challenge was not known to the challenging party
prior to acceptance. Clearly that was the case here. In addition, the
challenge must be made before the indictment is read to the jury. 3 '
Here the prosecution was commenced by information, but the infor-
mation had not been read to the jury at the time of the challenge.
As a result, the court held that the state had a right to challenge
this juror and further found that the evidence was sufficient to show
that the trial judge properly exercised her discretion in granting the
challenge for cause under article 797(2).'" In two previous cases, '37 the
court, under similar fact situations, found error in excusing the juror
and allowing an alternate juror to be inserted; 'the conviction and
sentence were reversed in both cases. However, the court now has
changed its position and found that it is proper to excuse a juror for
cause on the ground that he is "not impartial" and hence is "unable
to perform" his duties within the meaning of article 789, which pro-
vides for replacing with alternate jurors those jurors "who become
unable to perform or disqualified from performing their duties prior
to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict." Here, the court
132. 411 So. 2d at 5.
133. 410 So. 2d 1116 (La. 1982).
134. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 795:
A juror cannot be challenged for cause by the state or the defendant after
having been accepted by the challenging party, unless the ground for the challenge
was not known by the challenging party prior to acceptance. A challenge for cause
must be made before the indictment is read to the jury.
A peremptory challenge may be made by the state at any time before the juror
is accepted by it, and by the defendant at any time before the juror is sworn.
135. Under LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 461, the term "indictment" includes information.
136. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 797:
The state or the defendant may challenge a juror for cause on the ground that:
(2) The juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his partiality. An opinion
or impression as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant shall not of itself
be sufficient ground of challenge to a juror, if he declares, and the court is satisfied,
that he can render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence.
137. State v. Buggage, 351 So. 2d 95 (La. 1977); State v. Rounsavall, 337 So. 2d
190 (La. 1976).
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approved the replacement of the challenged juror with an alternate
juror and expressly overruled the Rounsavall and Buggage cases. The
author fully agrees with this quite proper and fair interpretation of
the code articles involved.
INSTRUCTIONS
In State v. Mack," the Louisiana Supreme Court was presented
with a jury charge on reasonable doubt that was clearly wrong.' 9
Objection to the charge, however, was not made by defense counsel
until after the jury had retired for deliberation. This clearly raised
the application of the contemporaneous objection rule, providing for
a waiver of objections not timely and properly raised. 4 ' On the basis
that errors in general charges cannot be corrected after the jury has
retired, the court had previously held that objections to the general
charge, to be timely, must be lodged prior to the time the jury retired
for deliberations."' In light of the practical difficulties with which a
defense attorney often is faced in making such an objection prior to
the retiring of the jury, simply because there is no reasonable oppor-
tunity to make such an objection and the content of the general charge
is not previously known, the court decided to change the rule.' Ac-
138. 403 So. 2d 8 (La. 1981). Justices Marcus, Blanche, and Watson dissented from
the judgment; Justice Lemmon concurred in the denial of application for rehearing.
139. The instruction was as follows:
You are prohibited by law and your oath from going beyond the evidence to seek
for doubts upon which to acquit the defendant, but must confine yourself strictly
to a dispassionate consideration of the testimony given upon the trial. You must
not resort to extraneous facts or circumstances in reaching your verdict. That
is, you must not go beyond the evidence to find facts or circumstances creating
doubts, but must restrict yourselves to the evidence that you heard on the trial
of this case.
Id. at 9.
140. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 841 provides:
An irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was ob-
jected to at the time of occurrence. A bill of exceptions to rulings or orders is
unnecessary. It is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the
court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires
the court to take, or of his objections to the action of the court, and the grounds
therefor.
The requirement of an objection shall not apply to the court's ruling on any
written motion.
141. State v. Jefferson, 379 So. 2d 1389 (La. 1980); State v. Williams, 366 So. 2d
1365 (La. 1978); State v. Beard, 312 So. 2d 278 (La. 1975). An apparent exception to
this rule was carved out in State v. Williamson, 389 So. 2d 1328 (La. 1980), for
cases in which the general charge misdefines the alleged crime.
142. The court specifically overruled Jefferson, 379 So. 2d 1389, Williams, 366
So. 2d 1365, and Beard, 312 So. 2d 278, to the extent that they are inconsistent
with Mack, 403 So. 2d at 10.
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cordingly, it held that "an objection to the judge's general charge is
properly preserved if made immediately after the jury is retired, par-
ticularly if that is the first opportunity to object. Defense counsel is
not required to interrupt the judge during the charge and have the
jury removed while the point is argued."'4 The principle is that the
alleged error must be brought to the attention of the trial judge at
a time when the court can cure the alleged error.144 The court went
on to suggest14' that the general charge be reduced to writing, as is
required under the terms of article 801,146 when requested by the
defendant or the state. This is an excellent practical suggestion which
is in effect in many jurisdictions' 7 and one which, in the opinion of
this author, should be made mandatory in all cases rather than depen-
dent upon the request of either the defendant or the state.
It should be noted that the court in Mack was concerned only
with the general charge of the court. Under the terms of article 807,48
special charges may be submitted, but counsel need not object
thereafter if the trial court rejects the proposed special charge and
gives an erroneous statement of the law as a part of the general
charge.'49
Of course, the failure to submit a timely and proper proposed
special charge waives any error." Justice Lemmon, concurring in the
143. 403 So. 2d at 10 (footnote omitted).
144. State v. McDermitt, 406 So. 2d 195 (La. 1981) (interpreting and applying Mack).
145. The court also observed that "[c]areful practice would suggest that C.Cr.P.
801 be followed, and the charge reduced to writing on defendant's request and copy
provided to defendant before reading. In busy courts today, however, we recognize
that this course would use precious time of judge, jury, and counsel." 403 So. 2d at
10. It is difficult to see how this would possibly consume much time. However, Justice
Lemmon believes "this imposes a substantial burden on the trial court and need not
be encouraged." Id. at 12 n.2.
146. It should be noted, however, that this request must be made "prior to the
swearing of the first witness at the trial on the merits." LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 801.
This time requirement seems unduly restrictive and unrealistic.
147. See IDAHO CODE § 19-210 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 67 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1982); NEv. REv. STAT. § 175.161 (1979).
148. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 807 provides:
The state and the defendant shall have the right before argument to submit
to the court special written charges for the jury. Such charges may be received
by the court in its discretion after argument has begun. The party submitting
the charges shall furnish a copy of the charges to the other party when the charges
are submitted to the court.
A requested special charge shall be given by the court if it does not require
qualification, limitation, or explanation, and if it is wholly correct and pertinent.
It need not be given if it is included in the general charge or in another special
charge to be given.
149. State v. Marmillion, 339 So. 2d 788 (La. 1976).
150. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 807 & 841. See notes 140 & 148, supra.
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denial of rehearing, made it clear that the real problem involved in
the application of the contemporaneous objection rule to the instruc-
tion area in Louisiana is the absence of opportunity for the trial judge
and counsel to meet prior to the charge to the jury for the purpose
of having the judge rule on requests relating to the jury charges.15" '
Such a meeting between counsel and the trial judge would also give
counsel a clear opportunity to make and argue objections to the
general charge which the judge intends to give to the jury. Such a
procedure was established for the federal courts by Rule 30 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 52
Against this background the legislature in the 1982 session enacted
Act 458, amending article 801 as follows:
[A] party may not assign as error the giving or failure to give
a jury charge or any portion thereof unless an objection thereto
is made before the jury retires or within such time as the court
may reasonably cure the alleged error. The nature of the objec-
tion and grounds therefore shall be stated at the time of objec-
tion. The court shall give the party an opportunity to make the
objection out of the presence of the jury."
The effect of this provision seems to be to codify the Mack rule,
although without making available any effective means of asserting
the alleged error. The phrase "within such time as the court may
reasonably cure the alleged error" seems certain to require further
interpretation. It is submitted that the far better solution would be
to require written instructions in every case and also to require an
instruction conference prior to the giving of the charge, as noted
above.' 4
151. 403 So. 2d at 11 (Lemmon, J., concurring in the denial of the application for
rehearing).
152. FED. R. CRIM. P. 30 provides:
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the
court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that the court in-
struct the jury on the law as set forth in the requests. At the same time copies
of such requests shall be furnished to adverse parties. The court shall inform
counsel-of its proposed action upon the requests prior to their arguments to the
jury, but the court shall instruct the jury after the arguments are completed.
No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom
unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. Oppor-
tunity shall be given to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury and,
on request of any party, out of the presence of the jury.
See also United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374, 1387-88 (11th Cir. 1982).
153. See LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1793: "A party may not assign as error the giving of
the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires
to consider its verdict, stating specifically the matter to which he objects and the
grounds of his objection."
154. One result of not requiring written instructions is that there is no way for
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The content of instructions on reasonable doubt continues to pre-
sent serious problems. In 1978 the Louisiana Supreme Court, in con-
struing article 804,155 the mandatory statutory formulation of
reasonable doubt, stated that a reading of the exact language of arti-
cle 804 "would have been preferable...... The question was again
presented to the court in State v. Mack,157 where the court stated that
"we decline to sanction jury instructions which substitute misleading
and unclear statements for the direct statutory language of C.Cr.P.
804."'"8 Taking the next step, therefore, the court held that a reading
of article 804 is mandatory in every case. Finally, in State v.
McDaniel,"9 Justice Dennis, speaking for the court, reiterated that
article 804 does not require the trial court to define further the con-
cept of reasonable doubt nor does it require any special charge other
than that contained in the article. 0 He "cited the famous McCormick
dictum to the effect that the explanations of reasonable doubt
themselves often need more explanation than the term itself' to show
that it is usually preferable to read only the exact language of article
804 to the jury. Justice Watson, concurring, put the matter flatly:
an appellate court to review alleged errors. See State ex rel. Ferrand v. Blackburn,
414 So. 2d 1207 (La. 1982). The failure to make a contemporary objection to instruc-
tion at trial precludes raising this error in a collateral proceeding, as well as on ap-
peal. State ex rel. Ross v. Blackburn, 403 So. 2d 719 (La. 1981).
155. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 804 provides in part:
A. In all cases the court shall charge the jury that:
(1) A person accused of crime is presumed by law to be innocent until each
element of the crime, necessary to constitute his guilt, is proven beyond a
reasonable doubt;
(2) It is the duty of the jury, in considering the evidence and in applying to
that evidence the law as given by the court, to give the defendant the benefit
of every reasonable doubt arising out of the evidence or out of the lack of evidence
in the case; and
(3) It is the duty of the jury if not convinced of the guilt of a defendant beyond
a reasonable doubt, to find him not guilty.
The court may, but is not required to, define "the presumption of innocence"
or "reasonable doubt" or give any other or further charge upon the same than
that contained in this article.
156. State v. Henderson, 362 So. 2d 1358, 1366 (La. 1978).
157. 403 So. 2d 8 (La. 1981).
158. Id. at 11..
159. 410 So. 2d 754 (La. 1982).
160. Id. at 756. See also State v. Taylor, 410 So. 2d 224 (La. 1982), which held that
article 804 specifically permits the trial judge to define reasonable doubt and to give
additional charges. The court also found that although the definition was lengthy,
repetitious, and if taken out of context, somewhat confusing, reasonable persons of
ordinary intelligence would have no problem with the definition. In this connection,
see Charrow & Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinquistic
Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306 (1979). See also A. ELWORK, B. SALES,
& J. ALFFNI, MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE (1982).
161. C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE S 341, at 800 (1972).
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"I respectfully suggest that as to reasonable doubt it would be best
for the trial courts to read the pertinent portion of [article 804] to
the juries and avoid lengthy explanations which open the door to possi-
ble error.""'
Considering these developments, it would seem clear that pru-
dent trial judges of this state will confine their charges concerning
reasonable doubt to a simple and exclusive reading of article 804.
VERDICTS
Is a unanimous verdict required to convict for a lesser offense
where the defendant has been charged with a capital offense but the
state, prior to trial, stipulates that it will not seek the death penalty?
In State v. Goodley'3 the supreme court held that a unanimous ver-
dict is required.1" The analysis of this issue centered upon the fact
that the legislature based the requirement of unanimous verdicts on
the severity of the punishment for the crime, rather than the ultimate
result of the trial; i.e., the crime for which convicted or the sentence
that was received. The court held specifically that the charge under
which the accused is prosecuted determines whether or not a
unanimous verdict is required. 5
In State v. Hayes,6 ' the defendant was charged under three counts.
The jury returned a unanimous not guilty verdict on Count I, a guil-
ty verdict on Count II by a nine to three vote, and a guilty verdict
on Count III by an eleven to one vote. The vote of the jury was dis-
closed as the result of both a written and oral poll"6 7 requested by the
defendant.' 6 When the poll was completed, the judge announced that
the verdicts on Counts I and III were confirmed, but that the jury
had not reached a proper verdict as to Count II. The jury was then
returned to deliberate on Count II only. When the jury returned, a
finding of guilty was announced. At the defendant's request the jury
was repolled on Count II, and this confirmed a guilty verdict by vote
of eleven to one. The trial judge then denied the defendant's request
for a repolling on Count III on the basis that the jury had already
162. 410 So. 2d at 757 n.1.
163. 398 So. 2d 1068 (La. 1981). Justice Lemmon dissented.
164. The court had previously held that the number of jurors required is to be
determined solely by the nature of the crime charged. State v. Stanford, 204 La. 439,
15 So. 2d 817 (1943).
165. The court pointed out that the state could recharge the accused with a non-
capital crime and thus avoid the requirement of a unanimous verdict. 398 So. 2d at 1071.
166. 414 So. 2d 717 (La. 1982).
167. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 812.
168. When the polling on Count II was being conducted, the foreman commented,
"Someone's changed their mind." 414 So. 2d at 722.
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been polled on that count. The defendant's theory was that in the
confusion of the vote on Count II, there was a possibility that further
deliberation might have produced some change in the vote on Count
III, producing a resolution in his favor. As the court put it, a repoll-
ing of the jury as to Count III "would surely not have been out of
the order. On the other hand, it was not required.""'6 This result cer-
tainly seems both reasonable and just, and this is an area in which
the sound discretion of the trial judge is almost indispensible.
State v. Givens'0 raised the question as to whether the trial judge
possesses an independent right to order a poll of the jury. The Loui-
siana Supreme Court had consistently held in the past that in the
absence of a request by either the state or the defense, the court
was under no obligation to order the jurors polled.' Article 812 does
not specifically address this problem, as it provides only that the court
must order the polling if requested either by the state or the
defendant.' 2 Finding that article 812 does not expressely prohibit the
trial judge from ordering such a jury poll on his own motion, the court
proceeded to justify the action of the trial judge on the basis that
it "was consistent with the duty of the trial court to administer the
system of jury trials in Louisiana."'7 3 There should be little disagree-
ment with this result, but it would seem more appropriate if article
812 were amended to reflect the specific authority of the trial judge
to order polling of the jury on his own motion.' 4
The United States Supreme Court has made an important deci-
sion in the area of inconsistent rulings in nonjury criminal trials. In
Harris v. Rivera,'75 a New York trial judge sitting without a jury tried
three defendants on five seperate charges arising out of one criminal
episode. The evidence presented normally would have resulted in the
acquittal of all defendants on all counts or in convictions against all.
However, the trial judge convicted two of the defendants on two
counts and acquitted the third on all counts. The case reached the
Supreme Court after the United States Court of Appeals had reversed
the denial of the defendant's application for a federal writ of habeas
corpus by holding that the state trial judge had committed federal
169. Id.
170. 403 So. 2d 65 (La. 1981).
171. See State v. Johnson, 171 La. 95, 129 So. 684 (1930); State v. Fernandez, 157
La. 149, 102 So. 186 (1924); State v. Bullock, 136 La. 167, 66 So. 767 (1914); State v.
Colomb, 108 La. 253, 32 So. 351 (1902); State v. Atkinson, 104 La. 570, 29 So. 279 (1901).
172. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 812.
173. 403 So. 2d at 67.
174. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(d): "When a verdict is returned and before it is record-
ed the jury shall be polled at the request of any party or upon the court's own motion."
175. 102 S. Ct. 460 (1981).
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constitutional error because he had not explained this apparent in-
consistency on the record.176 In a per curiam opinion, 7 the Court held
that there is no federal requirement that a state trial judge explain
his reasons for acquitting a defendant and even if the acquittal rests
on an improper ground, such error would not create a constitutional
defect in a guilty finding that is supported by sufficient evidence and
is the product of a fair trial. The Court further held that a defendant
who is found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt after a fair trial has
no federal constitutional ground to complain that another defendant
was acquitted.' 8
176. The court of appeals recognized that its constitutional holding was un-
precedented. Rivera v. Harris, 643 F.2d 86, 94 (2d Cir. 1981).
177. Justice Marshall dissented on procedural grounds. 102 S. Ct. at 466.
178. Id. at 466. See People v. Vaughn, 409 Mich. 463, 295 N.W.2d 354 (1980), where
the defendant was found guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon but not guilty
of possession of a firearm.
